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Abstract
Optimal tax and spending allocation rules are derived in an en-
dogenous growth model in which raw labor must be educated to be-
come productive and infrastructure services aﬀect the schooling tech-
nology. The optimal tax rate is found to depend only on the elasticities
of output with respect to infrastructure services and educated labor.
The optimal share of spending on infrastructure (relative to education)
depends also on these elasticities, as well as the quality of schooling
and the degree to which infrastructure services aﬀect the production
of educated labor. Congestion costs in education tend to raise the
optimal share of spending on infrastructure.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: O41, H54, I28.
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21 Introduction
T h ei m p a c to fp u b l i ci n v e s t m e n to ng r o w t hh a sb e e nt h es u b j e c to fm u c h
attention in recent academic research and policy debates (see Zagler and
Durnecker (2003) for an overview). Research has focused in particular on the
eﬀects of public infrastructure, both at the empirical and analytical levels.
At the empirical level, Easterly and Rebelo (1993), in an early contribution,
found a positive association across countries between public investment in
infrastructure (transportation and communications) and growth. In a “re-
run” of the Easterly-Rebelo regressions, Miller and Tsoukis (2001) conﬁrmed
this eﬀect.1 Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2003), using panel data for 30 devel-
oping countries and an econometric methodology that explicitly accounts for
the government budget constraint and possible biases arising from omitted
variables, found that the share of government capital expenditure in GDP is
positively and signiﬁcantly related to income growth per capita, whereas the
share of current expenditure is not. Calderón and Servén (2004), using a large
sample of countries and panel data covering the period 1960—2000, found that
growth is positively aﬀected by the stock of infrastructure assets.2 Loayza,
Fajnzylber, and Caldéron (2004) found that public infrastructure (measured
by the number of telephone lines per capita) has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. Albala-Bertrand and
Mamatzakis (2004) found that in Chile, public infrastructure capital had a
positive eﬀect on private investment in recent years and thus, indirectly, on
1Whereas Easterly and Rebelo (1993) found no eﬀect of infrastructure investment on
private capital formation, and no eﬀect of total public investment on growth, Miller and
Tsoukis (2001) also found a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of overall public investment on
growth.
2In contrast to Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2003), Calderón and Servén (2004) do not
account for the govenrment budget constraint in their estimation. As a result, their
simulation exercises should be viewed with caution.
3growth. Gupta et al. (2005), in a study focusing on 39 low-income countries
during the 1990s, found that the composition of public expenditure mat-
ters signiﬁcantly in assessing the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on economic growth.
Countries where a large fraction of government spending consists of wages
and transfers tend to have slower growth, whereas countries where higher
shares of spending are allocated to capital and nonwage goods and services
tend to have faster growth.3
At the analytical level, much eﬀort has also been devoted to analyzing
the growth eﬀects of public investment (particularly in infrastructure), in the
context of endogenous growth models. A series of contributions, following
an early paper by Barro (1990), treat public investment as a ﬂow–see, for
instance, Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), Corsetti and Roubini (1996), Chang
(1999), Fiaschi (1999), Turnovsky (2000), Eicher and Turnovsky (2000), and
Rivas (2003). By contrast, contributions by Futagami, Morita, and Shibata
(1993), Fisher and Turnovsky (1998), Dasgupta (1999), Rioja (1999), and
Turnovsky (1997, 2004), among others, treat public infrastructure as a stock.
These studies have provided much insight into the determinants of growth-
and welfare- maximizing shares of public investment in infrastructure. For
instance, Barro’s key result, in a model where public spending takes the form
only of production-enhancing services, was shown by Futagami, Morita, and
Shibata (1993) to remain valid in a setting where it is the public capital
stock, rather than the ﬂow of public spending, that aﬀects production. Other
researchers have focused on the broader issue of the optimal ﬁscal structure,
that is, the simultaneous determination of optimal tax and expenditure rates.
Turnovsky (1996) for instance, considered the determination of the optimal
3It should be noted, however, that this study, like many along the same line, does not
account for spending on maintenance.
4consumption and income tax rates, the share of government spending on
output, and optimal debt in an endogenous growth framework. Addressing
the issue of the optimality of the overall ﬁscal structure is important for
the design of ﬁscal reform, given the possible interdependence between tax
collection and the allocation of public resources among alternative forms of
expenditure.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the deter-
mination of the optimal tax and expenditure structure in a growth context,
as in Turnovsky (1996). However, unlike Turnovsky, I do so in an endoge-
nous growth model with both physical and human capital accumulation, and
a government that provides infrastructure, education, and utility-enhancing
services. As in Agénor (2004), the model assumes that the economy is en-
dowed only with “raw” labor, and that raw labor must be educated to be-
come productive. Knowledge is thus embodied in (educated) workers, unlike
Lucas-type models where human capital is disembodied and can therefore
grow without bounds. Moreover, in the model infrastructure has a positive
eﬀect on the rate of human capital accumulation. This speciﬁcation cap-
tures the view that infrastructure services (better roads, reliable access to
electricity, etc.) may enhance the ability of individuals to study and acquire
s k i l l s .T h i si sap a r t i c u l a r l yi m p o r t a n tc o n s i d e r a t i o nf o rl o w - i n c o m ed e v e l o p -
ing countries. In many of these countries, the lack of an adequate network of
roads makes access to schools (particularly in rural areas) diﬃcult; dropout
r a t e st e n dt ob eh i g h e rw h e nc h i l d r e nm u s tw a l kl o n gd i s t a n c e st og e tt o
school. The lack of access to electricity hampers the ability to study, both
in the classroom and at home. In some countries, the lack of adequate toi-
let facilities for girls in rural area schools has led many parents to deny an
education to their daughters. As it turns out, accounting for the impact of
5infrastructure on the schooling technology has important implications for the
determination of the optimal allocation of government expenditure.
Another issue that I address in the paper is the existence of congestion
costs in education. Again, this is a particularly important factor in deter-
mining the quality of schooling in low-income countries, where (according to
recent data from UNESCO and the World Bank) student-teacher ratios may
dramatically exceed average ratios in industrial countries. For instance, at 44
to 1, the pupil-teacher ratio in sub-Saharan Africa is on average three times
higher than that of developed countries; moreover, one in four countries in the
region has ratios above 55 to 1 (see UNESCO (2005)). Much research has ex-
amined the issue of congestion costs in infrastructure, and their implications
for private capital formation and the optimal allocation of public expendi-
ture (see, for instance, Turnovsky (1997), Fisher and Turnovsky (1998), and
Eicher and Turnovsky (2000)). But almost none has focused on congestion
costs in education.4 As discussed later, the existence of these costs also has
important implications for determining the growth-maximizing allocation of
public spending.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the
model. Section III solves for the steady-state growth rate in the decentralized
equilibrium, and examines its dynamic properties. Section IV illustrates
the functioning of the model by considering a revenue-neutral change in the
composition of public spending, namely a switch from spending on education
to infrastructure services. Section IV derives the growth-maximizing ﬁscal
structure. Section V introduces congestion costs in education in the model,
4Evidence on the impact of the quality of schooling (as proxied by international dif-
ferences in mathematics and science test scores) on growth is provided by Hanushek and
Kimko (2000). Note also that quality can depend also on the intensity of instruction, that
is, the number of contact hours per student year (see UNESCO (2005)).
6and examines the eﬀect of these costs on the optimal allocation of government
expenditure. The ﬁnal section summarizes the main results of the paper and
oﬀe r ss o m ec o n c l u d i n gr e m a r k s .
2 The Model
Consider an economy populated by an inﬁnitely-lived representative house-
hold who produces a single traded good, whose price is ﬁx e do nw o r l dm a r -
kets. The good can be used for either consumption or investment. The econ-
omy’s endowment consists of raw labor, which must be educated (through
a publicly-funded schooling system) to be used in the production process.
The government provides at no charge infrastructure, education and utility-
enhancing services. It levies a ﬂat tax on output to ﬁnance its expenditure.
2.1 Production
Output, Y , is produced with private physical capital, public infrastructure
services, educated labor, using a Cobb-Douglas technology:5
Y = G
α
I(χE)
βK
1−α−β
P = AP(
GI
KP
)
α(
E
KP
)
βKP, (1)
where KP is the stock of private capital, GI government infrastructure ser-
vices, E the stock of educated labor, χ ∈ (0,1) the proportion of the educated
labor force employed in production, AP ≡ χβ > 0,a n dα,β ∈ (0,1).T h u s ,
production exhibits constant returns to scale in all factors. In the present
framework, constant returns to scale in reproducible factors (E and KP)i s
not necessary to generate permanent growth. As long as GI/KP and E/KP
are constant (which turns out to be the case in the steady state), output will
5Throughout the paper, the time subscript t is omitted. A dot over a variable is used
to denote its time derivative.
7exhibit linearity in the stock of private capital. The production function is
then essentially an AK-type technology.
2.2 Household Preferences
The inﬁnitely-lived representative household-producer maximizes the dis-
counted stream of future utility
V =
Z ∞
0
∙
C1−θ
1 − θ
+ φlnGH
¸
exp(−ρt)dt, −∞ <θ≤ 1, (2)
where C is consumption, GH utility-enhancing government services, ρ>0 the
discount rate, σ =1 /θ the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (with θ =1
corresponding to the logarithmic utility function), and φ>0 ac o e ﬃcient
that measures the impact of GH on the household’s instantaneous utility.
Thus, as for instance in Turnovsky (1996, 2000, 2004), Chang (1999), and
Baier and Glomm (2001), publicly-provided services aﬀect the household’s
utility directly. However, unlike these authors, and in line with Cassou and
Lansing (2003), private consumption and public services are assumed to be
additively separable. This is in line with the empirical evidence provided by
Karras (1994), McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997), Chiu (2001), and
Okubo (2003), among others.
Output is taxed at the rate τ ∈ (0,1). The household spends on consump-
tion and accumulates capital. It receives from the government teachers’ pay,
(1−χ)wGE,w h e r ewG i st h er e a lw a g ea n d1−χ the proportion of teachers
i nt h ee d u c a t e dl a b o rf o r c e .A Sn o t e de a r l i e r ,e d u c a t i o ni sp r o v i d e df r e eo f
charge and there are no user fees for infrastructure services used in produc-
tion. Thus, public spending-related production rents accrue to the household.
Abstracting from capital depreciation, the household’s resource constraint is
C + ˙ KP =( 1− τ)Y +( 1− χ)wGE. (3)
82.3 Human Capital Accumulation
Raw labor, which grows at a constant rate, n, must be educated before
it can be used in the production process. The production of educated labor
requires the combination of teachers, students, and government infrastructure
services:
˙ E = Q[(1 − χ)E]
κG
μ
IL
1−κ−μ, (4)
where ˙ E is the ﬂow of newly-educated workers, L the number of students,
Q a variable that measures the quality of schooling, and κ,μ ∈ (0,1).T h u s ,
the education technology exhibits constant returns to scale in E, GI,a n dL.
Quality is an increasing function of the ratio of government spending on
education, GE , and the number of teachers:
Q =[
GE
(1 − χ)E
]
η, (5)
where η ∈ (0,1).T h i s s p e c i ﬁcation indicates therefore that the quality of
education exhibits decreasing returns to scale with respect to GE/E.I n c r e a s -
ing the number of teachers for instance, without increasing at the same time
spending on items such as books, writing materials, meals for students, and
so on, would reduce the ability of the education system to produce educated
labor.
Combining (4) and (5) yields
˙ E =( 1− χ)
κ−η(
GE
E
)
η(
E
L
)
κ+μ(
GI
E
)
μL. (6)
In what follows, I ignore depreciation (or de-skilling) of educated labor.
I also assume that the government’s “admission” policy for students in the
education system is such that it keeps the student-teacher ratio constant:
L
(1 − χ)E
= a, (7)
9where a>0.T h i sr u l ei m p l i e st h a t ,a l o n gt h eb a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t h ,w h e r e
E grows at a constant rate, L must also grow at the same constant rate.
Moreover, to ensure that this equality holds continuously, I assume that the
growth rate of the total population of raw labor (from which students are
selected), n, is greater than the steady-state growth rate of E.
U s i n g( 7 ) ,e q u a t i o n( 6 )c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
˙ E
E
= AE(
GE
E
)
η(
GI
E
)
μ, (8)
where AE ≡ a1−κ−μ(1 − χ)1−η−μ. Thus, the growth rate of the stock of edu-
cated labor depends on public spending on both education and infrastructure
services per teacher (or educated worker). Note also that, as a result of (7),
it does not matter whether the quality of schooling is deﬁned as a function
of the ratio of government spending per teacher (as in (5)) or per student.
2.4 Government
The government provides infrastructure, education, and utility-enhancing
services to the representative household, pays salaries to teachers, and col-
lects a proportional tax on output. It cannot issue debt and must maintain
a balanced budget continuously.6 Thus, the government’s ﬂow budget con-
straint is given by
P
h=I,E,H
Gh +( 1− χ)wGE = τY. (9)
Expenditure on all categories of services are taken to be determined as
fractions of tax revenue, so that Gh = υhτY,w i t hυh ∈ (0,1),a n dh =
6See Turnovsky (1996, 1997) for the case of debt ﬁnancing in a similar context. Because
Ricardian Equivalence holds in the present framework, excluding borrowing is simply a
matter of convenience. With government borrowing, agents would foresee that higher
taxation would be required later in order to repay the accumulated debt, and this would
need to be accounted for.
10I,E,H. Teachers’ salaries are also ﬁxed as a fraction ϕ of tax revenue. The
government budget constraint therefore implies that
P
h=I,E,H
υh + ϕ =1 , (10)
which determines residually one of the spending shares.
From (3) and (9), the market-clearing condition for the goods market is
Y = C + ˙ KP +
P
h=I,E,H
Gh. (11)
3 The Decentralized Equilibrium
In the present setting, a decentralized equilibrium can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a set of inﬁnite sequences
for the quantities {C,KP,E}∞
t=0,s u c ht h a t{C,KP}∞
t=0 maximizes equation
(2) subject to (3), and the path {KP,E}∞
t=0 satisﬁes equations (8), (10), and
(11), for given values of the tax rate, τ, the ratio of government wages to
output, ϕ, and the spending shares on services, υh,w i t hh = I,E,H.
This equilibrium can be characterized as follows. The household-producer
maximizes (2) subject to (3), taking the tax rate, τ, government services and
wage payments, GH and (1 − χ)wGE, as given. The current-value Hamil-
tonian for this problem can be written as
Λ =
C1−θ
1 − θ
+ φlnGH + λ[(1 − τ)Y +( 1− χ)wGE − C],
where λ is the costate variable associated with constraint (3). Using (1),
ﬁrst-order optimality conditions for this problem can be written as, setting
s ≡ (1 − τ)(1 − α − β),s ot h a ts ∈ (0,1):
dΛ
dC
=0= ⇒ C
−θ = λ, (12)
11ρ − ˙ λ/λ =
dΛ
dKP
= sAP(
GI
KP
)
α(
E
KP
)
β, (13)
together with the budget constraint (3), the initial condition KP(0) = K0
P,
and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞λKP exp(−ρt)=0 . (14)
Equation (12) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow
value of private capital, λ. Equation (13) is the standard Keynes-Ramsey
consumption rule, which equates the rate of return on consumption (given
by the term on the left-hand side) to the after-tax marginal physical product
of private capital (equal to 1 − τ times ∂Y/∂KP).
Combining Equations (12) and (13) yields
˙ C
C
= σ
∙
sAP(
GI
KP
)
α(
E
KP
)
β − ρ
¸
, (15)
whereas substituting (1) in (3) yields
˙ KP =( 1− τ)AP(
GI
KP
)
α(
E
KP
)
βKP +( 1− χ)wGE − C. (16)
As shown in the Appendix, equations (8), (10), (15), and (16) can be
further manipulated to lead to a system of two nonlinear diﬀerential equations
(see equations (A7) and (A8)) in c = C/KP and e = E/KP. These two
equations, together with the initial condition e0 = E0/K0
P > 0,a n dt h e
transversality condition (13), rewritten as
lim
t→∞c
−1 exp(−ρt)=0 , (17)
determine the dynamics of the decentralized economy. The balanced-growth
equilibrium (BGE) can therefore be deﬁned as follows:
12Deﬁnition 2. The BGE is a set of sequences {c,e}∞
t=0,s p e n d i n gs h a r e s
and tax rate satisfying Deﬁnition 1, such that for an initial condition e0 equa-
tions (8) (15), and (16) and the transversality condition (17) are satisﬁed,
and consumption, the stock of educated labor, and the stock of private capital,
all grow at the same constant rate γ = ˙ C/C = ˙ E/E = ˙ KP/KP.
The transversality condition (17) is always satisﬁed along any interior
BGE because consumption and the stock of private capital grow at the same
constant rate, implying that the ratio c = C/KP is also constant.7 Given the
form of the utility function used here, a necessary condition to get bounded
utility (that is, for the integral in (2) to converge) is ρ>(1 − θ)γ.T h i s
condition imposes no restriction when θ>1.W h e n θ<1, it imposes an
upper bound on admissible values for the rate of growth. Equivalently, it
r e q u i r e st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c et ob es u ﬃciently large.
From equations (A4) and (A6) in the Appendix, γ is given by the equiv-
alent forms8
γ = sσAP(υIτ)
α/(1−α)˜ e
β/(1−α) − σρ, (18)
γ = Aυ
η
Eυ
(αη+μ)/(1−α)
I τ
(η+μ)/(1−α)˜ e
ω, (19)
where ˜ e denotes the steady-state value of e, A a constant term, and
ω =
(η + μ)(α + β − 1)
1 − α
< 0.
As shown in the Appendix, the following proposition can be established:
7Note also that from (1), because ˙ E/E = ˙ KP/KP,
˙ Y
Y
= α
˙ GI
GI
+[ β +( 1− α − β)]
˙ KP
KP
,
and because GI = υIτY (so that the growth rates of GI and Y are the same), output also
grows at rate γ.
8Equation (A3) in the Appendix provides a third equivalent form of γ.B u ti tc a ne a s i l y
be shown that, given the steady-state solution for c, it is in fact equivalent to (18).
13Proposition 1. Along an equilibrium path with a strictly positive growth
rate, the BGE is unique. There is only one stable path converging to this
equilibrium.
This proposition implies therefore that the model is locally determinate.
Its dynamics can be analyzed using phase diagrams, as illustrated in Figure
1. The ˙ e =0curve (denoted EE in the ﬁgure) always has a positive slope
in c-e space, whereas the slope of the ˙ c =0curve (denoted CC)c a nb e
either upward- or downward-sloping, depending on the size of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, σ. The upper (lower) panel corresponds to the
case where σ is relatively high (low), in a sense made precise in the Appendix.
The saddlepath, denoted SS, may therefore have either a positive or negative
slope. Following a jump in c (as a result, for instance, of a change in the
tax rate or one of the spending shares parameters), c and e may or may not
move in the same direction. The reason is that the transitional dynamics
are driven by the ratio of educated labor to private capital, and as this ratio
increases (falls), the marginal productivity of private capital increases (falls)
as well. In turn, this tends to raise (reduce) consumption and investment
over time.
4 Revenue-Neutral Spending Shift
T h es t e a d y - s t a t ee ﬀects and transitional dynamics associated with revenue-
neutral changes in spending shares are straightforward to analyze in the
present setting. In particular, the Appendix establishes that an increase in
υI,o ﬀset by a reduction in υE (that is, with dυI + dυE =0 ,h o l d i n gτ and
ϕ constant), has an ambiguous eﬀect on the steady-state growth rate, as
summarized in the following proposition:
14Proposition 2. With the tax rate and the share of government spend-
ing on wages held constant, a switch in the composition of public expendi-
ture from education to infrastructure services has an ambiguous eﬀect on the
steady-state growth rate. If infrastructure services do not aﬀect the education
technology (μ =0 ), the net eﬀect depends only on α/β.W i t hμ>0,t h en e t
eﬀect depends also on μ/η.
To understand the intuition behind these results, consider ﬁrst the case
where μ =0 . Increasing the fraction of government spending on infrastruc-
ture (for a given stock of educated labor) increases the marginal product of
physical capital, which, in turn, raises investment and steady-state growth.
At the same time, however, because the change is revenue neutral (dυI =
−dυE), the ratio of educated labor-physical capital unambiguously falls, as
long as η>0. Thus, the positive eﬀect of the increase in the share of spend-
ing on infrastructure is accompanied by a lower supply of educated workers,
which tends to lower private production and reduce the growth rate. The net
eﬀect on output and the growth rate, depends on how “productive” the two
inputs are in relative terms, that is, on the ratio α/β.A ss h o w ni nt h eA p -
pendix, if α/β exceeds the elasticity of the steady-state value of the educated
labor-capital ratio with respect to the share of spending in infrastructure, the
growth eﬀect (as well as the eﬀect on the consumption-capital ratio) will be
positive.
With μ>0,t h en e te ﬀect on the steady-state ratio of educated labor to
physical capital is also ambiguous; itn o wd e p e n d so nr e l a t e dn o to n l yt oh o w
productive the two types of services are in the production of goods, but also
to how productive they are in the production of educated labor, as measured
by the ratio μ/η. Even if infrastructure services have a small impact on the
production of goods, a high ratio μ/η m a ys t i l li m p l ya ni n c r e a s ei n˜ e, ˜ c,a n d
15γ. In the particular case where η =0 , that is, if education services do not
aﬀect the acquisition of skills, the eﬀect on the steady-state growth rate is
unambiguously positive.
Figure 2 illustrates two possible outcomes, with a relatively high value of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and a ratio μ/η that is not too
large. In both cases, therefore, the educated labor-capital ratio falls in the
steady state. But the consumption-capital ratio and the growth rate may
either increase or fall, depending on the magnitude of α/β, as noted earlier.
In both panels curve CC shifts to the left, but curve EE can shift either
to the right (upper panel) or the left (lower panel). In the upper (lower)
panel, CC shifts by more (less) than EE and the consumption-capital ratio
falls (increases). The steady-state consumption-capital ratio falls in the ﬁrst
case and increases in the second.9 As noted ealier, during the transition,
the fall in the educated labor-capital ratio lowers the marginal productivity
of capital, leading to a gradual reduction in the stock of physical capital.
This reduction is large enough to ensure that the consumption-capital ratio
increases over time.
5 The Growth-Maximizing Fiscal Structure
To determine the growth-maximizing ﬁscal structure in the decentralized
equilibrium involves setting simultaneously the tax rates and expenditure
shares, so that ∂γ/∂τ = ∂γ/∂υh =0 , ∀h. Given the structure of the model,
this problem can be addressed in two stages, the ﬁrst of which involves solving
for the optimal rate, subject to the constraints that spending shares are
9In both cases, the impact eﬀect is shown as operating in the same direction as the
long-run eﬀect. However, this is always true only if the consumption-capital ratio increases
in the steady state.
16exogenous. From (18) and (19), the following proposition can be readily
established:
Proposition 3. With all government spending shares held constant, the
growth-maximizing value of the tax rate is τ∗ = α + β.
This result generalizes the rule τ∗ = α,w h i c hw a sﬁrst established by
Barro (1990) in a ﬂow model, and subsequently in stock models by Futagami,
Morita, and Shibata (1993), Turnovsky (1997), and Baier and Glomm (2001).
The Barro rule is obtained only in the particular case where educated labor
(or, more generally, human capital) has no eﬀect on production, that is,
β =0 . Note, however, that the optimal tax rate depends only on parameters
characterizing the goods production technology; it is independent not only
of how the revenue is spent (that is, the spending shares υh and ϕ) but also
of the parameters characterizing the education technology.
The second stage involves allocating public expenditure between infrastruc-
ture, education and utility-enhancing services, with the tax rate and the share
of government spending on wages both taken as given. The following propo-
sition can be shown to hold:
Proposition 4. With the tax rate and the share of government spending
on wages held constant, the growth-maximizing composition of public expen-
diture is
υ
∗
H =0 ,
υ∗
I
υ∗
E
=
α
β
+
μ
η
(1 +
α
β
). (20)
That the optimal value of υ∗
H is zero is of course a direct implication
of assuming separability between utility-enhancing government services and
private consumption. As a consequence, spending on this type of services
has no eﬀect on growth, as noted earlier. To provide a more intuitive inter-
17pretation the second result, it is convenient to consider the particular case
where ϕ =0 . Given (10), Proposition 4 implies therefore that
υ
∗
E =
β
α + β
(1 +
μ
η
)
−1 =
ηβ
(α + β)(η + μ)
< 1,υ
∗
I =1− υ
∗
E. (21)
Equation (20) implies that if the production function for educated labor
does not depend on infrastructure services, that is, with μ =0 ,t h eo p t i m a l
allocation of spending between infrastructure and education would depend
only on the parameters characterizing the goods production technology (the
ratio α/β) not on the education technology, as I have shown elsewhere (see
Agénor (2004)). In addition, from (21) the optimal shares would thus be
υ∗
I = α/(α + β) and υ∗
E = β/(α + β),a n d ,f r o mP r o p o s i t i o n3 ,t h es h a r e so f
spending in output would be τ∗υ∗
I = α and τ∗υ∗
E = β.10 In the general case
where μ>0, however, the education technology does matter for the allo-
cation of government spending; the optimal share of spending on education
(infrastructure) is lower (higher) than otherwise. As can be inferred from
(20), the more productive infrastructure services are in fostering the acquisi-
tion of skills (the higher μ is), or the lower the quality of education (the lower
η is), the higher should be the optimal share of spending on infrastructure
services. Note also that an improvement in the quality of education has no
eﬀect on the optimal allocation of public expenditure if infrastructure ser-
vices do not aﬀect the production of educated labor. And in the limit case
where η −→ 0 (so that public spending on education has no eﬀect on the
schooling technology), υ∗
E −→ 0 (or, equivalently, υ∗
I −→ 1), as could be
expected.
Given that the optimal tax rate is independent from spending shares, and
conversely that the optimal shares are independent of the tax rate, the results
10The result τυI = α was also derived by Lee (1992) in a model without human capital
accumulation.
18in Propositions 3 and 4 indeed summarize the optimal ﬁscal structure in a
decentralized economy. The issue to which I turn next is the extent to which
the degree of congestion in the education technology aﬀects the optimal tax
rate and spending shares.
6 Congestion Costs
As noted earlier, much of the endogenous growth literature on congestion
costs has focused so far on two types of congestion costs: those aﬀecting the
use of infrastructure services (or capital) in the production of goods, and
those aﬀecting utility-enhancing services.11 In the context of the present
p a p e r ,am o r en o v e li s s u et oc o n s i d e ri st h ec a s ew h e r ei ti st h eu s eo fi n -
frastructure services in the education technology that is subject to congestion.
A related issue is the extent to which the quality of education depends on
how crowded classrooms are, with congestion taking the form of threshold
eﬀects.
Speciﬁcally, two alternative ways of modeling congestion costs in educa-
tion are considered. The ﬁrst approach consists of assuming that the pro-
ductivity of infrastructure services falls with an increase in the ﬂow number
of students (or newly-educated individuals), ˙ L:
˙ E = Q[(1 − χ)E]
κ(
GI
˙ Lδ )
μL
1−κ−μ, (22)
where δ ≥ 0 measures the degree of congestion (with δ =1denoting propor-
tional congestion). For instance, too many students using publicly-provided
internet services may slow the speed of access for everybody, thereby dimin-
ishing the usefulness of these services for creating educated labor. Given that
11For examples of the former literature, see Turnovsky (1997), Fisher and Turnovsky
(1998), and Glomm and Ravikumar (1999); for examples of the latter, see Turnovsky
(1996), Rioja (1999), and Piras (2004).
19from (7), ˙ E = ˙ L, it is straightforward to show that using equation (22) in-
stead of (4) does not aﬀect any of the previous results regarding the optimal
ﬁscal structure (Propositions 3 and 4). The reason is clear–equation (22)
boils down to a geometric transformation (will all coeﬃcients multiplied by
(1+δμ)−1) of the original expression for educated labor ﬂows. Although this
changes the stability properties of the model and its transitional dynamics
(and thus the speed of convergence to the BGE), it does not alter the optimal
allocation rule because it is the ratio μ/η that appears in Proposition 4.12
The second approach to account for congestion in the production of ed-
ucated labor is to assume that quality is subject to threshold eﬀects. In the
foregoing analysis, it was assumed throughout that the ratio of students to
teachers, L/(1 − χ)E (denoted by x below) is kept ﬁxed at a by the gov-
ernment. However, whether a is “high” or “low” has obvious implications
for the quality of schooling. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the quality of educa-
tion, Q, has a parameter η t h a tc a nb eh i g ho rl o w( ηH or ηL, respectively),
depending on whether the student-teacher ratio is lower or greater than a
threshold value, aC:
Q =
½
QH = xηH,
QL = xηL,
if a ≤ aC
if a>a C
.
This speciﬁcation implies that the model can generate multiple BGEs,
a full characterization of which is beyond the scope of this paper. For the
purpose at hand, it is suﬃcient to observe that, from Proposition 4, the
two regimes would be characterized by diﬀerent optimal allocations between
infrastructure and education services: in the ηL-regime, the optimal share
υ∗
E would indeed be lower than in the ηH-regime. These results can be
summarized in the following proposition:
12However, the steady-state levels of both c and e are lower.
20Proposition 5. Congestion costs in education (in the form of threshold
eﬀects on the quality of schooling) raise the optimal share of public spending
a l l o c a t e dt oi n f r a s t r u c t u r e .
Because the optimal tax rate does not depend on the parameters charac-
terizing the education technology, Proposition 3 is not aﬀected.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper was to study the determination of optimal taxation
and allocation of public resources between utility-enhancing, infrastructure,
and education services. The analysis was based on an endogenous growth
model with two key features: raw labor must be educated to become produc-
tive and infrastructure services aﬀect the schooling technology. Government
spending is ﬁnanced by a tax on output. The balanced growth equilibrium
was derived, and the transitional dynamics associated with an shift in the
composition of public spending from education to infrastructure services were
analyzed. It was shown that, in general, this shift has an ambiguous eﬀect
on the growth rate and the steady-state values of the consumption-capital
and educated labor-capital ratios.
The third part of the paper focused on the determination of the optimal
tax rate and spending shares. The optimal tax rate was found to be equal
to the sum of the elasticities of output with respect to infrastructure services
and educated labor, and thus to be independent of the schooling technology.
The optimal composition of public spending was shown to be a zero share
for utility-enhancing services, whereas the optimal allocation to infrastruc-
ture (education) services was found to be positively (negatively) related to
the degree to which infrastructure services aﬀect the production of educated
21labor, and negatively (positively) to the quality of schooling. If infrastruc-
ture services are not education-enhancing, the optimal allocation between
infrastructure and education would depend solely on the parameters char-
acterizing the goods production technology. Finally,under the assumption
that congestion costs in education take the form of threshold externalities
associated with the quality of schooling, the optimal share of spending on
infrastructure (education) was shown to be positively (negatively) related to
the degree of congestion in education.
The analysis in this paper could be extended in several directions. A
ﬁrst area of investigation would be to consider the case where it is the stock
of public capital in infrastructure, rather than the ﬂow of spending on in-
frastructure services, that aﬀect the production technology for goods and
educated labor. I have pursued this line of research in a companion paper
(see Agénor (2005a)), and the results indicate that the optimal rules remain
qualitatively similar to those derived in the present paper. A second direction
would be to consider other forms of distortionary taxation, such as a tax on
consumption, wages, or capital income, as for instance in Turnovsky (2000).
With an endogenous supply of (raw) labor, a tax on wages would also aﬀect
private decisions between labor and leisure, and the rate of growth. A tax on
the returns from private capital would aﬀect decisions between consumption
and investment. Both taxes are likely to have ambiguous eﬀects on growth,
because their adverse eﬀect on private investment and labor supply are oﬀset
by an increase in the stock of public capital.
A third potentially fruitful area of research relates to the role of utility-
enhancing public services. In the model presented in this paper, the utility
function of the representative household was assumed to be additively sep-
arable between private consumption and public services, as suggested by
22some of the empirical evidence. This speciﬁcation implies that with the tax
rate and the share of government spending on wages held constant, a switch
in the composition of public expenditure from utility-enhancing services to
the provision of either infrastructure or education services is unambiguously
growth-enhancing. This result is of course due to the fact that the share
of spending on utility-enhancing services has no eﬀect on the economy’s
steady-state growth rate, neither directly or indirectly (through changes in
the steady-state value of the ratio of educated labor to physical capital).
However, while separability may be intuitively obvious for some categories
of utility-enhancing public services (such as security or national defense), this
is not quite so for others, such as health services. Better health care, for in-
stance, may have a direct impact on the ability of individuals to consume and
enjoy their free time. In addition, better health may also aﬀect the ability
to produce and study. With a more general (non-separable in C and GH)
utility function, the zero share result mentioned above would not hold, as
can be inferred from the results of Lee (1992), Baier and Glomm (2001), and
Turnovsky (1997, 2004). Indeed, with non separability in preferences, and
possibly an eﬀect of GH on production of goods and educated labor (because
these services are health-enhancing, for instance, and therefore increase the
productivity of production workers, students, as well as teachers) it would
not be optimal to allocate a zero share to that category of spending. Deter-
mining how exactly the optimal rules are aﬀected would represent therefore
a worthwhile complement to the present analysis.
23Appendix
Substituting (9) in (16) using Gh = υhτY yields
˙ KP = qAP(
GI
KP
)
α(
E
KP
)
βKP − C, (A1)
where q ≡ 1 − τ(υI + υE + υH)=1− τ(1 − ϕ),w i t hq ∈ (0,1),g i v e nt h a t X
υh < 1.F r o m( 3 ) ,w ea l s oh a v eq ≡ 1 − τ(1 − ϕ).
From the deﬁnition of GI,a n du s i n g( 1 ) ,
GI = υIτY = υIτAP(
GI
KP
)
α(
E
KP
)
βKP,
that is, with e = E/KP,
GI
KP
= υIτAP(
GI
KP
)
αe
β,
or equivalently
GI
KP
=( υIτAP)
1/(1−α)e
β/(1−α). (A2)
Substituting (A2) in (A1) yields
˙ KP
KP
= qA
1/(1−α)
P (υIτ)
α/(1−α)e
β/(1−α) − c, (A3)
where c = C/KP.
Similarly, using (A2), equation (15) can be rewritten as
˙ C
C
= σ
h
sA
1/(1−α)
P (υIτ)
α/(1−α)e
β/(1−α) − ρ
i
. (A4)
From the deﬁnition of GE, and using (1),
GE = υEτY = υEτAP(
GI
KP
)
α(
E
KP
)
βKP,
so that, using (A2),
GE
KP
= υEτA
1/(1−α)
P (υIτ)
α/(1−α)e
β/(1−α) = υEA
1/(1−α)
P υ
α/(1−α)
I τ
1/(1−α)e
β/(1−α).
(A5)
24Equation (8) gives
˙ E
E
= AE[(
GE
KP
)(
KP
E
)]
η[(
GI
KP
)(
KP
E
)]
μ = AE(
GE
KP
)
η(
GI
KP
)
μe
−(η+μ),
so that, using (A2) and (A5),
˙ E
E
= AE
h
υEA
1/(1−α)
P υ
α/(1−α)
I τ1/(1−α)eβ/(1−α)
iη
(υIτAP)−μ/(1−α)e−βμ/(1−α) e
−(η+μ).
This expression can be rewritten as
˙ E
E
= Aυ
η
Eυ
(αη+μ)/(1−α)
I τ
(η+μ)/(1−α)e
ω, (A6)
where A ≡ AEA
(η+μ)/(1−α)
P ,a n d
ω ≡ (η + μ)[−1+
β
1 − α
]=
η + μ
1 − α
(α + β − 1) < 0,
given that α + β<1.
Combining equations (A3), (A4), and (A6) yields
˙ c
c
= Γ(υIτ)
α/(1−α)e
β/(1−α) − σρ+ c, (A7)
˙ e
e
= Aυ
η
Eυ
(αη+μ)/(1−α)
I τ
(η+μ)/(1−α)e
ω −
qA
1/(1−α)
P (υIτ)α/(1−α)
e−β/(1−α) + c, (A8)
where
Γ ≡ A
1/(1−α)
P (σs− q). (A9)
This expression is negative (positive) if σ is lower (higher) than the ratio
q/s:
sg(Γ)=sg(σ − s
−1q). (A10)
To investigate the dynamics in the vicinity of the steady state, the system
(A7)-(A8) can be linearized to give
∙
˙ c
˙ e
¸
=
∙
a11 a12
a21 a22
¸∙
c − ˜ c
e − ˜ e
¸
, (A11)
25where the aij are given by
a11 =˜ c, a21 =˜ e,
a22 = ωAυ
η
Eυ
(αη+μ)/(1−α)
I τ
(η+μ)/(1−α)˜ e
ω −
βqA
1/(1−α)
P (υIτ)α/(1−α)
(1 − α)˜ e−β/(1−α) < 0,
a12 =
β˜ c
1 − α
Γ(υIτ)
α/(1−α)˜ e
ω/(η+μ),
where ˜ e and ˜ c denote the stationary values of e and c,a n ds g (a12)=sg(Γ).13
From (A7), setting ˙ c =0yields
˜ c = σρ− Γ(υIτ)
α/(1−α)˜ e
β/(1−α). (A12)
Similarly, from (A8), setting ˙ e =0yields
˜ c = qA
1/(1−α)
P (υIτ)
α/(1−α)˜ e
−β/(1−α) − Aυ
η
Eυ
(αη+μ)/(1−α)
I τ
(η+μ)/(1−α)˜ e
ω. (A13)
From these two equations, it can be seen that the slopes of the CC and
EE curves are given by
d˜ c
d˜ e
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
CC
= −
a12
a11
= −
βΓ
1 − α
(υIτ)
α/(1−α)˜ e
ω/(η+μ),
d˜ c
d˜ e
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
EE
= −
a22
a21
> 0.
Thus, whereas EE always has a positive slope, the slope of CC is upward-
(downward-) sloping if Γ is negative (positive).
c is a jump variable, whereas e is predetermined over time. Saddlepath
stability requires one unstable (positive) root. To ensure that this condition
holds, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of the
dynamic system (A11), ∆,m u s tb en e g a t i v e ,t h a ti s ,∆ = a11a22−a12a21 < 0.
If a12 > 0, this condition is always satisﬁed; CC, in that case has a negative
slope (see the upper panel of Figure 1). If a12 < 0,i tr e q u i r e s−a12/a11 <
−a22/a21,t h a ti s ,EE must be steeper than CC,a ss h o w ni nt h el o w e rp a n e l
13Note that from (A3), (A4) and (A6), we also have a22 = ωγ − β(γ +˜ c)/(1 − α).
26of Figure 1. Note that if σ is suﬃciently low, Γ < 0 and a12 < 0 (see (A10)).
T h es l o p eo ft h es a d d l e p a t hSS,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y−a12/(˜ c − ν),w h e r eν is
t h en e g a t i v er o o to ft h es y s t e m ,i st h u sp o s i t i v e( n e g a t i v e )i fΓ is negative
(positive).
Equation (A12) can be substituted in (A8) with ˙ e =0to yield the implicit
form
F(˜ e)=Aυ
η
Eυ
(αη+μ)/(1−α)
I τ
(η+μ)/(1−α)˜ e
ω−σsA
1/(1−α)
P (υIτ)
α/(1−α)˜ e
β/(1−α)+σρ =0 ,
(A14)
given that, from (A9), Γ + qA
1/(1−α)
P = σsA
1/(1−α)
P .
To show that the BGE is unique, note ﬁrst that from (A14), and using
(18) and (19), or equivalently (A4) and (A6),
F˜ e =(
Ω
γ
)
1/ω
∙
ωγ −
β
1 − α
(γ + σρ)
¸
, (A15)
where Ω ≡ Aυ
η
Eυ
(αη+μ)/(1−α)
I τ(η+μ)/(1−α). This expression is negative along a
BGE with a strictly positive γ,g i v e nt h a tω<0.T h u s ,F(˜ e) cannot cross
the horizontal axis from below. Now, we also have F(0) = σρ > 0.G i v e n
that F(˜ e) is a continuous, monotonically decreasing function of ˜ e,t h e r ei sa
unique positive value of ˜ e that satisﬁes F(˜ e)=0 . From (A12), there is also
a unique positive value of ˜ c. Thus, the BGE is unique.
Equations (A12) and (A14) can be used to examine the impact of changes
in spending shares and the tax rate on the steady-state levels of c and e.I n
particular, using the implicit function theorem, it can be established that
∂˜ e/∂υI = −FυI/F˜ e is in general ambiguous. Given that, from (A15), F˜ e < 0,
sg(∂˜ e/∂υI)=sg(FυI).I n t u r n , FυI can be shown to be equal to, in the
“neutral” case where dυI = −dυE (see Proposition 3),
FυI =
−ηγ
υE
+
(αη + μ)γ
(1 − α)υI
−
α(γ + σρ)
(1 − α)υI
,
Suppose that υH = ϕ =0so that initially υE =1− υI.T h u s ,FυI < 0 if
μ =0 ,s ot h a t∂˜ e/∂υI < 0 also.
In general, from (A12),
∂˜ c
∂υI
= −Γ(υIτ)
α/(1−α)˜ e
β/(1−α)
∙
αυ
−1
I
1 − α
+
β
˜ e(1 − α)
(
∂˜ e
∂υI
)
¸
.
27Similarly, from (A4),
∂γ
∂υI
= sσAP(υIτ)
α/(1−α)˜ e
β/(1−α)
∙
αυ
−1
I
1 − α
+
β
˜ e(1 − α)
(
∂˜ e
∂υI
)
¸
Denoting ε˜ e/υI =( ∂˜ e/∂υI)(υI/˜ e), and given that Γ > 0 in Figure 2, we
therefore have
sg(
∂γ
∂υI
)=−sg(
∂˜ c
∂υI
)=sg(
α
β
+ ε˜ e/υI).
If ε˜ e/υI < 0 (which is always the case if μ =0or more generally if μ/η
is small), the eﬀect on growth is positive if α/β > − ε˜ e/υI.I fε˜ e/υI > 0 the
eﬀect on growth is always positive. Graphically, it can be veriﬁed from (A12)
and (A14) that a rise in υI always leads to a shift in CC to the left (given
that Γ > 0), whereas the shift in EE can be either to the right (upper panel
of Figure 2) or the left (lower panel).
T h ei m p a c te ﬀect of a rise in υI on the consumption-private capital ratio,
given that de0/dυ =0 ,i s
∂c0
∂υI
=
∂˜ c
∂υI
+
a12
˜ c − ν
(
∂˜ e
∂υI
), (A16)
which is also ambiguous in general, given that ∂˜ c/∂υI is ambiguous. If ∂˜ e/∂υI
< 0,g i v e nt h a ta12 > 0,t h e n∂c0/∂υI < 0 if ∂˜ c/∂υI < 0,a ss h o w ni nt h e
upper panel of Figure 2.
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The Balanced Growth Equilibrium
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Shift in the Composition of Government Spending
            from Education to Infrastructure
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